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Rewriting Citizenship in Displacement:
Displaced People’s Struggles for Rights
Lyla Mehta and Rebecca Napier-Moore*
For displaced pe ople, citizensh ip (or th e  lack  of it) is a crucial issue . D isplaced people are  denied 
form al citizensh ip and righ ts but are  now  claim ing th em , subjectively see ing th e ir de  facto 
e xpe rie nce  as lived citizensh ip. Protests, claim  asse rtions and transnational alliance s are  w ays in 
w h ich  th e ir struggle  for righ ts is m anife ste d. M uch  of th e  existing literature  tends to focus on a 
top- dow n understanding of displaced people as citizens/non- citizens and th e  form al proce sse s 
available (or not available) to th em , ignoring th e  im portance  of inform al proce sse s as w el as 
local agency and practice , w h ich  th is article  explore s th rough  case  study e xam ples. Th e  article  
also e xam ine s displacem ent in th e  ligh t of diffe ring th eoretical m eanings of citizensh ip, and ask s 
to w h at e xtent th e  force d m igrant is a global or transnational citizen.
K eyw ords: Citizensh ip, D isplacem ent, Righ ts, People 's Struggle s
Mobility, displacement and emplacement have become defi ning features of our times. 
As long as there are wars, large-scale development projects and the more recent 
land grabs, people will be forced to move. This paper examines the implications 
for citizenship of various forms of displacement. While there is a large literature 
on displacement and citizenship, it tends to focus on top-down understandings of 
both. Few people are asking how displaced people are viewing their own citizenship 
and struggling for rights that they see as theirs. This paper aims to move away 
from normative government and inter-government perspectives which tend to 
have a ‘sedentarist’ (Malkki, 1992) lens. Instead, it focuses on how displaced people 
themselves understand their predicament and how they develop ways of coping 
with their problematic or non-citizenship status. We investigate formal and informal 
processes of rights claiming and expressions of local agency exercised by a range of 
displaced people. These responses can be seen as a form of ‘lived citizenship’. We also 
attempt to understand how globalization is accelerating displacement processes and 
whether displaced people can be seen to embody new forms of global or transnational 
citizenship. We thus investigate the limits and possibilities of new forms of ‘post-
national’ and denationalized or deterritorialized citizenship. 
We intentionally take a broad view of displacement, focusing on refugees, Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) and those affected by development-induced displacement 
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(DID). Whenever relevant, we focus on other non-citizens such as immigrants and 
undocumented workers who are denied basic rights. In this case, the distinction 
between voluntary and forced migration may be very blurred. Forced migration 
research has tended to separate out different categories of displacement, and there 
are purists who think that forced migration research should only focus on refugees. 
We use rights and citizenship as a way of bridging divides about different forms of 
displacement and migration (see also Grabska and Mehta, 2008). Traditionally, studies 
on refugees and displaced people (both oustees and IDPs) have rarely found common 
ground. In part, this has to do with differences in the causes of impoverishment, the 
massive institutional differences in the major agencies dealing with refugees, IDPs 
and oustees as well as the issue of determining who should assume responsibility for 
the successful resettlement and rehabilitation/integration of forced migrants, which 
we describe shortly. 
There are also differences in claims to entitlements. Legislative frameworks 
(international laws, human rights laws, legislations, conventions and treaties) embrace 
protection for refugees, based on the framework of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) and specifi c conventions such as the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees. Under international law, states are obliged to protect non-citizens 
and those residing within their national borders, including refugees, who often cannot 
claim entitlements from host states. This is the crux of the distinction between refugees 
and IDPs, whose status, even if they fl ee their homes for the same reasons as refugees, 
is defi ned and protected by the legal frameworks of their own nation. Thus, refugees 
have the protection of international law that IDPs lack even though the latter might 
be affected by similar conditions resulting from violence, violations of human rights, 
and natural or human-made disasters. The State is both the violator and protector of 
IDPs’ and oustees’ rights. In all cases, there are problems concerning defi nitions and 
the offi cial labels used to categorize displaced people, which constitutes a major focus 
in this article. 
In order to demonstrate how displaced people are living citizenship and negotiating 
the complex realities that confront them, we draw on an actor-oriented lens that “privileges 
the experiences of marginalized groups and their own understandings of rights, but 
without denying the importance of formal sources of rights. The approach enables the 
pushing of boundaries of formal legality when this is necessary for justice” (Nyamu-
Musembi, 2005, p. 48). We also examine de facto versus de jure citizenship experiences, 
and informal versus formal rights realization. The subjective is important here, because 
as Kabeer notes, “while the idea of citizenship is now nearly universal, ideas about 
citizenship are not, and never have been” (Kabeer, 2006, p. 91). Displaced people are 
very often struggling for rights that they see as important, enacting them, making them 
real, with or without a state’s offi cial consent. Formal notions of citizenship and rights 
deeply affect displaced people in terms of labelling them as deserving or undeserving of 
certain citizenship rights. Thus, we must assess two levels of the problem, viz. inclusion 
and exclusion from formal rights, and, importantly, whether those defi nitions of formal 
rights are what displaced people want. ‘Seeing like a citizen’ to use John Gaventa’s 
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phrase, means taking seriously the fact that displaced people often want a different 
combination of rights than what states or international bodies offer or defi ne for them 
(Gaventa, 2005). Too often “the formal notion of citizenship… contradicts, or is marginal 
to other forms of membership that may matter more” (Kabeer, 2006, p. 91). We also 
explore different defi nitions of citizenship: as membership, as quasi-citizenship, as 
multiple citizenships, and, of course, as global citizenship. 
In this article, we thus focus on a range of examples of displaced peoples’ 
struggles and demonstrate how attempts to push those formal boundaries have met 
with varying success (for example, refugee protests in Egypt and Ghana, and protest 
against dam-based displacement in India). In recent years, there has been increased 
media focus on displaced people openly protesting for their rights (Harrell-Bond, 
2008). But what do these protests mean in terms of citizenship struggles? In some 
cases, they are demands for rights within the country of residence. In others, they are 
protests on a supra-national level, aiming to affect the World Bank or home and third 
country policies towards them. Given the supra-national element of these protests and 
the international element associated with much displacement, this article examines 
the concept of global or transnational citizenship.
We begin with a discussion of how the character of displacement (and its 
international management) is shifting, and then move to formal defi nitions of citizenship 
and challenges to these top-down notions from displaced people. We demonstrate how 
displaced people are claiming rights and creating new understandings of citizenship. 
We then explore biases of civil and political versus social and economic rights as 
well as Eurocentric biases of citizenship/displacement. Finally, we end by exploring 
whether displaced people and refugees in particular are the only true transnational 
and/or global citizens.
THE SHIFTING CHARACTER OF DISPLACEMENT
Forced uprootedness is here to stay. At the end of 2009, UNHCR recorded 43.3 million 
forcibly displaced people worldwide, the highest number since the mid-1990s. Of these 
15.2 million were refugees. The fi gure also includes 9,83,000 asylum seekers and 27.1 
million (IDPs). Afghan and Iraqi refugees, the victims of the so-called wars on terror, 
accounted for almost half of all refugees under UNHCR’s responsibility worldwide 
(UNHCR, 2010). 
While the international development community has largely been concerned with 
refugees crossing borders, there is increased recognition that we must also pay attention 
to IDPs who experience refugee-like situations in their own countries. Further, people 
are also displaced due to the building of infrastructure projects for ‘development’ 
purposes such as mines, dams and roads, and more recently due to land deals that are 
displacing many thousands of people globally. Often known as oustees, these people 
are affected by Development-Induced Displacement (DID).1 Unfortunately, there are 
no recent estimates for DID; the last estimate in 1997 conservatively cited 10 million 
people being annually affected by DID (Cernea, 1997). 
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While the number of people of concern to UNHCR as estimated by the agency 
increase or decrease depending on the year, what is interesting to note is that people 
are remaining displaced (at least in camps) for longer periods of time than before. 
Protracted refugee camps are defi ned by UNHCR as circumstances in which groups 
of 25,000 refugees are in host developing countries for fi ve or more years.2 Some 5.5 
million refugees were in a protracted situation in 2009, living in 21 different countries. 
Spending longer time as refugees means longer time without citizenship rights, 
and/or longer time in which to settle in and informally make claim to rights in the 
host country. Many refugee camps, for instance, turn into small cities with booming 
economic centres, which can be a source of realization of economic rights for many. 
Other camps, and the marginalized areas of economically-active camps can remain 
without those for a very long time.
With respect to DID, with the advent of globalization, the acceleration of 
international capital fl ows and economic liberalization is likely to increase the number 
of ‘development’ projects, many of which are displacing people for the building of 
dams, roads, mines, etc. In India alone, since Independence in 1947, 21 to 50 million 
people or oustees have been displaced by large projects (see Hemadri, et al., 2000). 
Globalization, despite all its gains for some, is also leading to land grabbing, displacing 
many. It also leads to poor people moving to urban centres and the richer North in order 
to secure livelihoods and incomes. People displaced or threatened with displacement 
by development often fi ght against development projects, and once displaced, they 
have another struggle ahead of them for securing rights in their new location.
The above discussion highlights a worsening problem in terms of longer camps 
and globalization that would be likely to increase the number of displaced persons, 
many of whom are experiencing rights violations due to fears of terrorism, or simply 
State control. These are all discussions of peoples who have been labelled under 
various international displacement categories. Next, we look at the power of those 
categories, for inclusion, exclusion and the granting of rights.
Global Labels for Displacement
The power of categorization and awarding status to displaced people is linked to 
the ‘right’ to have ‘rights’. The labels ‘refugee,’ ‘oustee’ and ‘IDP’ are controversial, 
especially when it comes to policy formulation (see Gupte and Mehta, 2007). As argued 
by Zetter (1988), the label of refugee, for instance, both stereotypes and institutionalizes 
a certain status. Due to the strict requirements for refugee status provided in the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 Organization of African 
Unity Convention Governing the Specifi c Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, being 
granted the status is diffi cult for most forced migrants. In fact, the strict legal criteria 
and status determination procedures often employed either by the host governments 
or by the UNHCR on behalf of the governments imply that many remain outside the 
protection of international refugee law. Hence, we question these narrow legalistic 
defi nitions and adopt a more encompassing defi nition of refugees, including those 
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who either have offi cially applied for refugee status in the country of asylum or who 
do not feel safe enough to return to their country of origin. 
The category ‘displaced person’ or ‘forced migrant’ also designates a crisis and 
associated conditions of poverty and marginalization. Often the label implies a 
‘burden’ and imposes an institutionalized dependency (Zetter, 1988; 1985). At the 
same time, however, the category ‘refugee’ or ‘displaced person’ establishes rights 
and entitlements guaranteed under universal human rights regimes. For example, 
illegality and lack of refugee status mean limited and disadvantaged access to jobs,3 
lack of access to education for children,4 lack of access to health services, and the 
inability of refugees to claim their other rights in the host society,5 including freedom 
of movement.6 Rights, however, can be granted to refugees temporarily, pending one 
of the durable solutions to the refugee ‘problem’.7
The situation for those who have been given a label of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) is even more legally controversial. As people who have not crossed 
an international border, IDPs remain under the sovereignty and protection of their 
governments. In 1998, the UN Representative on internally displaced persons issued 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.8 Even though they do not constitute a 
binding legal document, they are based on and consistent with international human 
rights, humanitarian and refugee law. Unlike the protection accorded to refugees, the 
‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ contain only recommendations not 
legal obligations to protect IDPs (Deng and Cohen, 1998). 
The label, thus, not only categorizes, but also excludes, and, with this exclusion, 
displaced people are denied their basic human rights. These issues indicate several 
contradictions and a disjuncture between the idea ‘of global obligations’ and ‘universal 
declarations to secure rights and the local means to achieve them’. For example, 
people who live in the areas downstream of dams may have their right to livelihood 
infringed once a reservoir is dammed, which would put their fi shing livelihoods at 
risk. Others may want recognition for their rights in customary law and thus seek 
compensation for usufruct rights over trees and the forest. But such groups of people 
are not considered to be ‘project-affected persons’ and are denied compensation. Thus, 
resistance on the part of displaced people and their activist allies is often the result of 
inclusion by category or a struggle for compensation from which they were otherwise 
excluded. There are large differences in the standards of global agencies, as well as 
in the ways in which they are implemented at the local level. But global standards 
are also used by displaced people in their struggles. In Napier-Moore’s experience in 
camps in Uganda and Ghana, many displaced people are familiar with various legal 
frameworks and use them to demand a range of services from international agencies 
or states. In both Ghana and Uganda, for example, knowledge about the voluntariness 
of refugee repatriation and IDP return is mentioned often. 
There are massive institutional differences in the major agencies dealing with 
different categories of displaced people. UNHCR, for instance, is not supposed 
to provide direct assistance, but lobby and advocate for rights to be met, while the 
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UNRWA has the opposite mandate while working for Palestinians. IDPs are taken 
care of by UNHCR, the UN Offi ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) and national governments. Oustee concerns, on the other hand, are dealt 
with by the World Bank and regional banks such as the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), which provide funding to large projects, national governments and regional 
resettlement agencies. 
Under international law, states are obliged to protect non-citizens and those 
residing within their national borders. IDPs and oustees, on the other hand, even if 
they fl ee their homes for the same reasons as refugees, are to be protected by their own 
nation—often the violator of rights in the fi rst place, even though UNHCR has recently 
expanded its mandate to focus on IDPs. Oustees are displaced by the same State that 
is supposed to restore their livelihoods, rights and original standard of living. The 
international conventions and agreements that were designed for displaced people 
guarantee a smattering of different rights, which sometimes do and sometimes do not 
overlap with formal citizenship rights in the countries of displacement. We now turn 
to examine what citizenship means in the context of both internal and international 
displacement.
LAYERS OF EXCLUSION FROM FORMALLY DEFINED CITIZENSHIP
According to Nyers (2007), the practices of the State are premised on the normality of 
citizenship and the State. But they also produce the ‘accident’ of the refugee (ibid.) and 
we could add the migrant, the IDP and the oustee. Globally, the movements of refugees 
are seen to pose a problem. Refugees, displaced from ‘authentic political identities, 
communities of citizenship’, etc. are seen as signifying a temporary aberration to the 
norm, as hiccups that disturb ‘the national order of things’ (Malkki quoted in Nyers 
2007, p. 9). But as Nyers (2007), Malkki (2002) and Tuitt (2008) argue, their disturbance 
is precisely the catalyst and foil that induced states to make their boundaries and 
identity fi rm, using the displaced/out-of-place person as the marker for what defi nes 
outsiders and insiders. Traditional defi nitions of citizenship are premised on making 
these boundaries clear. But as we shall see below, the reality is that there are layers 
in the relationship with ‘formal citizenship’ and displaced people may not agree with 
these formal defi nitions. 
Traditional Defi nitions of Citizenship 
In conventional terms, citizenship is seen as political membership in a given nation-
state through which citizens possess civil, political and social rights. In migration 
literature, citizenship is traditionally bound to the status of being a ‘national’, which 
is particularistic and exclusive. Traditionally, access to citizenship (that was bound 
up with nationality) took place in three ways: ius sanguinis (law of the blood as in 
Germany, Greece), based on descent from a national of the country and ius soli (law 
of the soil), which is based on birth in the country questioned (for example, USA, 
Australia). In practice, both laws of blood and laws of the soil prevail. In addition, 
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ius domicili (law of residence) serves as a way in which people may gain citizenship 
through residence in the country. Dual citizenship, though increasing, is still a major 
political issue in the UK, Germany, India and elsewhere. One citizenship per person 
is the norm. Immigrants who reside in a country legally for many years often obtain 
special status with regard to residence, the right to work, protection from deportation, 
social security, etc. Often referred to as ‘denizens’ or ‘quasi-citizens’ (Hammar, 1990), 
such people are foreign citizens with legal and permanent resident status. Rather than 
an ‘all or nothing’ situation, the concept of denizens is of people formally having some 
but not all citizenship rights (1990). In India’s North-east, the homelands discourse 
makes ethnically defi ned outsiders and children denizens and perpetual foreigners 
(see Box 1). Such discourses and rules fuel exclusionary politics and also legitimize 
ethnic violence and constant displacements. 
However, millions are not lucky enough to have the level of rights that Hammar 
conceptualized for denizens or quasi-citizens. These include illegal workers, 
unauthorized family entrants, asylum seekers, rejected asylum seekers who have 
not yet been deported, people living in camps, and so on. These have been called 
‘margizens’ by Martiniello (1994). Margizens may enjoy civil rights and legal 
protection and even some social rights (as is the case for some asylum seekers in some 
countries), but not permanent residence and security where they live. Jaber Suleiman 
is a Palestinian refugee and activist in Lebanon. He writes of his status as a margizen: 
“Unlike most liberal democracies, where rights are linked to permanent residency, in 
Arab countries including Lebanon, the right to citizenship is considered as the primary 
right from which other basic rights are derived. Despite our protracted refuge in 
Lebanon, Palestinian refugees lack a separate legal status that distinguishes them from 
‘foreigners’ and grants them the basic human rights in accordance with the provisions 
of applicable international norms and standards.” (Suleiman, 2008, p. 94). 
Large-scale migration, as well as a host of reasons that will continue to compel 
people to fl ee and move, suggest that there is no turning back to an ideal of a state with 
a bounded and sedentary group of citizens, and that it is best to expand the notion of 
citizenship. The de facto current divisions of people all over the world into full citizens, 
denizens and margizens perpetuates racism and social tensions, drawing lines and 
labelling insiders as differentiated from people with partial or no rights (Castles and 
Davidson, 2000, p. 101). Box 1 looks at inclusion and exclusion for displaced people and 
specially protected ethnic groups. Special protection for one group may ironically mean 
exclusion for another. Thus, inclusion becomes the crux, as labelling in a category is 
often what displaced people want or need in their struggle to claim rights. Box 1 and the 
discussion later in this paper explore the different criteria in these citizenship and rights-
determining categories. Should citizenship be based on ethnic, territorial or other lines? 
CHALLENGES TO THE CONVENTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
Displaced people, in particular refugees, constitute a problem where conventional 
defi nitions of citizenship are concerned. They break the state-nation-territory triad that 
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conventionally and formally defi nes citizenship in the refugees’ home and host states 
(Nyers, 2007, p. 41). Refugees are nation-state citizens, but they have fl ed its territory. 
Their sense of belonging is thrown into question in both the home and host countries. 
Refugees have a twofold lack with respect to citizenship. Without citizenship in the host 
states, they are denied not only political rights but also the capacity to speak politically 
and the right to be heard. Hannah Arendt sees refugees representing a problem of not 
geographical/territorial but political space. They are people who have been denied 
their rights because they have been denied access to a political space that allows for 
a meaningful political presence (see Nyers, 2007). Being a refugee thus becomes an 
aberration. This is because conventional understandings of citizenship are treated as the 
only authentic political identity of modern political life. The aberration to political space 
caused by refugees signifi es our fi rst break in conventional notions of citizenship. 
Box 1
Inclusion and Exclusion: North-east India
Most nations have groups which differ from other groups in the country which 
ostensibly do not belong, and are therefore, denied citizenship rights, even though 
they may have formal citizenship. North-east India has about 157,000 displaced 
persons (Baruah, 2003). A large number of ‘tribal people’ or adivasis live in these areas, 
wherein the rights of non-adivasis to land ownership and exchange, business and 
access to elected offi ces are restricted. Besides, social transformations have attracted 
many migrants to the region.  North-east India is thus characterized by displacements, 
and divisive politics between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. 
The Booker winning novel, The Inheritance of Loss by Kiran Desai, aptly captures 
the contradictions in both entitlements for ethnically defi ned groups and the logic 
and norms of Indian citizenship in the North-east.  In the novel, Gyan, the Nepali 
tutor, betrays his girlfriend, Sai, to join an Indian–Nepali insurgency and asserts his 
identity as a ‘Gorkha’ (a term used for ethnic Indian Nepalis).  In the midst of all the 
demonstrations, Biju, the cook’s son, an undocumented dishwasher in Manhattan, 
who constantly escapes from the INS, returns ‘home’ without his passport. And 
Swiss Father Booty is forced to ‘return’ to Switzerland, stripped of his land, cows and 
property, despite having lived for 40 years in the hilly tract around Darjeeling. 
Indeed, the North-east has been the site for both the development-induced-displacement 
of adivasis and confl ict-induced displacement (for example, the Chakmas displaced in 
Arunachal Pradesh; Bengalis and tribes in Tripura; and the Santhals, descendants 
of tea workers brought to Assam as indentured labourers). Baruah argues that as 
economic and ethnic landscapes are more complex, traditionally unprotected groups 
are demanding the same kind of protection once extended to groups that were isolated 
(2003, p. 60). In such a context, there is a need to rethink conventional understandings 
of citizenship. He argues for the need for a kind of dual citizenship (that is, citizenship 
both of India and of a state). The aim of this policy would be to  “replace the ethnic 
principle with a civil principle and to give the right to defi ne the rules of inclusion and 
exclusion to territorially defi ned political communities” (2003, p. 62).
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IDPs and sometimes DIDs also break the state-nation-territory trinity. They remain 
within the territory, but the nation-state might not consider them part of it, and more 
importantly, they might not consider themselves part of the nation-state. Francis Deng, 
former Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, 
commented that it was not uncommon to hear IDPs say that those in power were ‘not 
our leaders’, and to hear government leaders say that IDPs were ‘not my people’ (2003, 
p. 5). The political space here is also ruptured, and we can see territory beginning to 
crumble as a determiner of citizenship rights. 
Growing international mobility generally—in addition to forced displacement—
changes to notions of ‘cultural homogeneity’, and the fact that millions of people have 
multiple citizenships and split lives, has also challenged the conventional notions 
of citizenship and belonging. This suggests new rules of conviviality. Castles and 
Davidson argue for dissolving the ‘nation part’ of the nation state (2000, p. viii), and 
replacing it with fl exible and open belonging, and a democratic state. Citizenship 
should be derived from residence on a state’s territory, cultural participation and 
economic involvement. It should no longer be determined in terms of belonging to 
certain cultural groups. In the ideal world, this would solve the IDP problem described 
above. Yet, this argument begs questions of political involvement for refugees, such as 
those who have crossed international borders but are still active, or think that it is their 
right to still be active in home country politics. Tibetan refugees protesting against 
the Chinese government in India, France or Nepal are doing so as part of belonging 
to what Castles and Davidson say are cultural (rather than territorial) groups. Rainer 
Baubock talks of ‘external citizenship’, in terms of the right to return, external voting 
rights, as well as in terms of citizenship duties of military service, taxes and compulsory 
voting (2007). Similarly, Giles Mohan describes a situation in which residents of a 
country ask: You do not pay taxes or get conscripted into the army, why should you 
vote? And the Diaspora’s voice responds: But we have poured tons of money into the 
country, and only 10-14 per cent of the residents pay taxes regularly anyway (2006). 
While it does work from the host country perspective to be highly inclusive of the 
people therein, territory-based citizenship overlooks the displaced person’s multiple 
conceptions of citizenship and what some people think is their right to continue 
citizenship participation in home countries. Saskia Sassen argues that the destabilizing 
of hierarchies of power in the nation-state have led to new political forces and actors 
which signal a ‘de-territorializing of citizenship practices and identities’ (2004, p. 191). 
Transformations inside the national state have also led to changes in the 
institutions of citizenship. She thus distinguishes between post-national citizenship 
and denationalized forms of citizenship (Sassen, 2004, p. 192). We can say that neither 
geographical nor political space notions in traditional citizenship hold up any more 
without signifi cant challenges to them.
The effects of globalization on displacement have also contributed to new problems 
and challenges to citizenship. Brysk and Shafi r (2004) argue that globalization has 
created a ‘citizenship gap which puts non-citizens and ‘second class citizens’ at risk 
(2004, p. 3). Globalization can be seen as the acceleration and intensifi cation of fl ows 
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(cultural, fi nancial, of people, information, and so on). But according to Brysk and 
Shafi r (ibid.), globalization intensifi es discrepancies and disparities, and the number of 
people in dual or overlapping status. It has led to a growing number of non-citizens—
migrants, refugees, IDPs, whose lives are affected by market trends, confl icts and 
policies in the North that impact unfavourably on southern lives and livelihoods. The 
forces of economic globalization have also led to widening disparities and a lowering 
of welfare standards (for example, basic services can be threatened due to privatization 
and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), jobs are lost due to foreign takeovers, 
and so on). Consequently, many more so-called ‘economic’ migrants emerge, who 
face increasing restrictions to work in richer countries. However, globalization has 
also created direct or indirect pressures on states to harmonize their standards with 
international ones. Consumer pressure on corporations is also, in turn, leading to 
pressure on the private sector to take initiatives on solving some problems. Thus, 
while globalization intensifi es a gap, it can also lead to a universalism of human rights 
standards that could potentially address the gap, though this seems long in coming. 
Why is this important? Refugees, IDPs and DIDs, increasing mobility, as well as 
economic and cultural globalization have questioned the traditional role of the nation-
state and the notion of distinct and untouched cultures, bounded within territory. This 
seems to suggest that the nation-state as a reference point of citizenship has to change. 
Globalization and increasing mobility constitute a positive feedback loop, seemingly 
reinforcing each other, leading to new feelings of cultural and political belonging 
(for example, voting in two countries for migrants, dual citizenship, and so on). New 
forms of citizenship have also emerged, for instance, multiculturalism as in Canada 
and citizenship through supra-national institutions and practices as in the Economic 
Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) or membership of the European Union 
(EU). We now turn to look at new forms of citizenship. 
DISPLACED PEOPLE CLAIMING RIGHTS AND
CREATING NEW UNDERSTANDINGS OF CITIZENSHIP
There are growing acknowledgements of the failure of ‘equal citizenship’—rendered 
visible through processes of claim-making on the part of refugees/immigrants, 
etc. Displaced people’s actions call for new understandings of citizenship. Indeed, 
displaced people’s actions are defi ning those new understandings. Box 2, for instance, 
describes IDPs in Sri Lanka forgoing formal citizenship so that they can instead be 
under the IDP label that guarantees their right to food, which they think is more 
important than the rights they would get under registration for citizenship. This is 
a strong message as to what they think about the worth of formal citizenship, and 
about the need to be labelled in a particular way in order that they might make real an 
important right to food. Similarly Palestinian, Jaber Suleiman, describes the demand 
for the Right to Return, rather than the demand for citizenship in exile (see Box 3). 
Much of the literature tends to focus on top-down understandings of displaced 
people as citizens/non-citizens and the formal processes available (or not) to them. 
Displacement, Citizenship and Rights 423
Box 2
 Rejecting Formal Citizenship to Claim Rights under the IDP Label
Brun (2003) demonstrates how in Sri Lanka people who are IDPs are denied their 
citizenship rights. They are not registered as citizens or not considered to be ‘local 
citizens’ (that is, residents within a district or province). The movement of IDPs within 
a country challenges the traditional understandings of citizenship because in this case, 
access to rights emerges as highly unequal. About 75,000 northern Muslims were 
expelled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from their homes in the north, 
but the Sri Lankan state is not able to provide for them in the south. Most citizens in 
Sri Lanka can register as residents or ‘local citizens’ in a province or after living there 
for six months, but this has not worked for northern Muslims, despite the fact that 
they have bought land. In part, many Muslims do not want to register because they 
may lose their IDP status, which means losing their right to rations and/or receiving 
assistance to return home to the north. Thus, they are willing to sacrifi ce citizenship/
resident rights in the interest of rations. Food, a social and economic right, is too often 
not included in formal defi nitions of citizenship rights, though some IDPs in Sri Lanka 
obviously consider it a more important right and have decided to make sure they can 
continue realizing/receiving it.
Box 3
Palestinians Demanding the Right to Return
Rather than Citizenship Rights in Host Countries
“[T]he Palestinian community in Lebanon is not looking for citizenship, and its 
demand for basic human rights does not entail the right to citizenship. In fact, the right 
of return is the highest priority for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. But obtaining basic 
human rights while in exile would serve to mitigate our destitution and alleviate our 
day-to-day suffering. Thus, in order to accommodate our isolation and neglect, we 
are seeking greater economic, social and cultural rights in the local Lebanese context.” 
(Suleiman, 2008, p. 95).
There is a noticeable silence about agency-driven citizenship amongst displaced people 
(especially in the global South). Citizenship is often realized through struggle, through 
making claims and asserting entitlements to rights. We now go on to demonstrate 
how displaced people are realizing rights and how they are participating in efforts 
to have formal rights granted and abuse of rights stopped, with some of this being 
effected through transnational alliances across global–local spaces. All these lead to 
new understandings of citizenship. 
Realizing Rights… Informally
Authors like Sassen (2004) have demonstrated that in situations where formal 
citizenship is not available to refugees and non-citizens, it can be observed that 
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they engage in the same practices as formally defi ned citizens. Thus, informal social 
contracts emerge between the ‘community’ and non-citizens. Sassen, for example, talks 
about multiple meanings of citizenship on the part of undocumented workers in the 
US where groups earn citizenship claims (for example, membership in a community, 
participation in civic activities). Sassen also talks of how marginalized groups move 
between powerlessness and the condition of being an actor, thus acquiring a presence 
in a broader political process. This presence entails the possibility of a politics, which 
while being centred in specifi c localities is transnational. 
While Sassen is talking about undocumented migrants, a category that often (but 
not necessarily) includes displaced people, Kibreab (2008) presents a similar scenario 
when talking about Eritrean refugees in his research on decisions by the latter to 
repatriate or stay in Sudan, the country of asylum. He shows that though denied formal 
rights by the Sudanese government, some Eritrean refugees have informally and de 
facto been able to enjoy economic and social rights nearly on par with the Sudanese, by 
establishing contacts with the host populations through social networks on the basis 
of religion, ethnicity, language, etc. They have succeeded in accessing economic and 
social rights even though they formally do not have ‘the right to have rights’. They 
own houses and access healthcare even though they are not supposed to; they live in 
urban centres even though their mobility is supposed to be restricted to designated 
zones; and by different means, some have acquired Sudanese nationality or residence 
permits. Those who have been able to enjoy those rights have not repatriated to Eritrea 
even when the causes for their displacement were no longer a threat to them. Those 
who did not realize those rights mostly returned to Eritrea (ibid.). In another example 
from Napier-Moore, during work with Liberian refugees in Ghana in 2006, several 
displaced Liberians explained that they did not want to go back to Liberia because 
the unemployment rate in the Ghanaian camp close to the capital was 30 per cent 
whereas in Liberia it averaged 70 per cent. Formally, they are not supposed to work 
without a work permit, which few people have. Nonetheless, the reality is that they are 
informally realizing (and prioritizing) their right to employment by giving up formal 
citizenship rights that they would have, or at least are supposed to have, in Liberia. 
In contrast, at the same time in 2006, Liberian refugees who had been encamped in 
reputedly worse conditions in Guinea (Human Rights Watch, 2002) were fl ocking 
home to what they hoped were a better realization of rights than what they were 
experiencing during their displacement. UNHCR held up the closing of Guinea camps 
as a shining example of successful refugee repatriation (UNHCR, 2006). However, 
from a displacement, actor-oriented perspective, the refugees’ agreement and desire 
to move back home was a strong sign that rights in exile were not being realized. This 
voice was not heard, or at least was not aired in media representations.
Some authors talk about self-settlement, rather than camps, as well, as being a 
means for displaced people (mostly refugees) to realize rights on their own. Van 
Damme (1995) notes the success of self-settlement in Guinea, where villages that 
welcomed refugees received international development and aid support. Epidemics 
were fewer, especially in comparison to extreme examples like the Goma camps in 
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Zaire, which experienced a cholera epidemic that killed an estimated number of 
50,000 people. Yet, Van Damme ends his report on Guinea saying that the “[m]ixing of 
refugees with the host population complicated targeting of food aid intended only for 
refugees; consequently this liberal policy has been changed and new arrivals are now 
concentrated in camps” (1995, p. 360). Camps were, in the end, preferred for the sake 
of targeting and effi ciency. The question, then, here is which rights matter. This kind 
of self-settlement can provide aid to whole communities in which displaced people 
settle. Although the literature largely lacks a refugee voice, it lacks it here especially. 
Do refugees want to be in camps or would they like to self-settle? Malkki’s classic 
Purity and Exile (1995b) describes two refugee situations: one, a camp in which refugees 
actively claim ‘refugee-ness’ and ‘Hutu-ness.’ They see themselves with an identity of 
categorical purity, while aid agencies see them as being naked and having lost their 
identity. The self-settled refugees in the townships refuse to be categorized. Theirs is 
a ‘subversion of identifi cation’ in which they ‘manage a series of different identities’. 
Both situations that Malkki describes involve refugee agency, whether that be to take 
on the narrative’s prescription wholeheartedly or to defy all essentializing categories. 
They prove that they are not just objects (blank slates to be written upon) but subjects 
‘creating their own refugee-ness’ (Malkki, 1995b, pp. 3, 4, 11, 153, 235). Some prefer 
the refugee label and encampment, seeing that as a means of securing the rights they 
want, especially in the way of affi liation with home country political voice. Others see 
self-settlement as a way to blend in, realizing rights that citizens in the host country 
were receiving, viz. informal citizenship rights.
Box 4
2005 Sudanese Protest in Cairo
In 2005, hundreds and thousands of Sudanese refugees staged a sit-in in downtown 
Cairo for three months. Their protest was against violations of their rights by 
UNHCR. Many saw local integration as problematic because their rights to 
education, work, housing, and lack of discrimination are severely curtailed (FMRS, 
2006). Many were also angry about their petitions and appeals for refugee status 
being rejected, leaving them without any formal legal status. This mobilization of 
refugees was unprecedented and large. The demonstration ended on 30 December 
2005, with a forced removal of all those protesting in the park in front of UNHCR’s 
offi ce. The removal was brutal, and 28 Sudanese died in the process. Many were 
injured and arrested. Those with offi cial papers were released within a few days, 
but 600 without formal status remained in detention for longer (ibid., p. 3). The 
Sudanese refugees were caught between UNHCR and the Egyptian state with both 
failing to deliver on their basic rights. They were also caught up in the politics of 
representation with their leaders and local NGOs. This example highlights the 
increasing contradictions between the vehicles/means to realize these rights (that 
is, through the host government or through the global agencies) and the politics of 
representation.
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Protest
Mehta and Gupte (2003) have focused on displaced people as agents of change as 
opposed to passive benefi ciaries of welfare/aid/charity or victims. The notion of 
refugees as ‘warrior communities’ has been put forward by Nyers (2007). One tragic 
example is the 2005 demonstration in Cairo, which resulted in 28 deaths after three 
months of making claims to UNHCR. One person at the protest said, “We live in a 
country of UNHCR” (Moulin and Nyers, 2007). Along those lines one can see that 
‘citizenship’ and its rights get messy. Refugees in Cairo and elsewhere see UNHCR 
as a sort of proxy state which is the provider of rights, and, therefore, direct protests 
to them rather than to the states (Harrell-Bond, 2008). Can the ‘country of UNHCR’ 
provide citizenship rights? In many situations, refugees are right: UNHCR is the 
most likely entity to take any action or to hear their voices on the provision of rights. 
UNHCR at least has remit for rights advocacy, but whether they hear and then act on 
requests for change from the refugee voices ‘from below’ is another question. See Box 
4 for more on the Cairo protest. 
Another example of protest is that undertaken by Ghana’s Buduburam refugee 
settlement in 2008. Not wanting to accept what they felt was becoming a forced 
repatriation without enough fi nancial support to build a new life in Liberia, and still 
holding on to hope of being resettled in the US, Liberian refugees held a fi ve-week 
sit-in on a fi eld next to the highway by the settlement. At the end of the fi ve weeks, 
Ghanaian authorities began arresting hundreds of people, saying that some had been 
protesting naked (BBC, 2008). Within days, 30 people had been deported, an action 
that violated refugee law and enraged the remaining refugees (International Herald 
Tribune, 2008). Liberians see several entities as the ensurers/providers of their rights. 
The Ghanaian state and UNHCR are two obvious ones, but many Liberians also see 
the US Government as being responsible for the provision of their rights. Liberia’s 
history is one of ‘founding’ by former US slaves, and some people in the refugee 
settlement told Napier–Moore that Liberia is seen as the 51st US state. They, therefore, 
hold hope that the US would come to their rescue, taking them in as refugees and 
then as citizens. Real-politik, however, suggests otherwise, and their subjective view 
of citizenship rights is very unlikely to be met by the US.
A graphic and media-attracting angle to protest is that taken by Abas Amini, an 
Iraqi asylum seeker in the UK, who sewed his eyes and mouth closed to highlight the 
lack of rights, maltreatment and unjust denial of asylum from the UK Home Offi ce. 
Also undertaking a hunger strike as a form of protest, Amini attracted a further 100 
protesters who gathered outside his residence (BBC, 2004). Protesters in the Woomera 
detention centre in Australia also sewed their lips shut in 2003, highlighting poor 
conditions and lack of rights in detention. These incidents indicate that not all is well in 
‘the North’, as those not granted formal rights fi ght to attract attention to the injustice. 
Harrell-Bond (2008) and Sylvan (2005) describe many other protests from displaced 
people. Harrell-Bond contends that protests have been going on as long as displaced 
people have experienced violations of their rights. We only hear more about them due 
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to journalists increasingly picking up the stories. Sylvan (2005) describes Bhutanese 
refugees marching peacefully in Nepal protesting their confi nement to camps and lack 
of right or ability to secure livelihoods. Many wanted repatriation and tried marching 
home, but were stopped by Indian authorities as they passed through Indian territory on 
the way. Harrell-Bond (2008) describes a poignant example of confl icts in the application 
of citizen rights, when she talks of Sudanese refugees working in camp schools alongside 
Ugandan nationals. Sudanese were paid a pittance ‘incentive’ wage by UNHCR/its 
implementing partners, while Ugandans were paid a very different national wage. The 
Sudanese, with support from Ugandan colleagues, formed a union in 1993. Both the 
Sudanese and Ugandan teachers went on a strike over the wage differential in 1997, and 
the Sudanese were threatened with being fi red from the job. Harrell-Bond rightly accuses 
UNHCR of not following the labour laws of host countries. Refugees want and should 
be paid on par with the local citizens, under international and national law mandating 
equal pay for equal work. There are seemingly countless such stories of public protest as 
a means of securing rights (see also Lewis, 2006).
These examples demonstrate how displaced people are protesting and questioning 
the top-down policy frameworks through which displacement, repatriation, integration 
and resettlement are characterized, and asserting their right to have rights. Such 
examples abound all over the global South and North. Still citizenship/displacement 
debates are rather top-down, ignoring the importance of local agency and practice. 
We have seen in this section, then, examples of displaced people realising their rights 
independently, or in spite, of formal state legislated rights or restriction to rights. 
And, we have seen examples of protest, when displaced people cannot realise rights 
informally and instead experience violations from states or international agencies.
Global–Local Rights Claims through Transnational Alliances:
The Cases of Tibet and Narmada
Falk describes a transnational citizen as an activist and an idealist, looking to ‘a future 
to be created’ (1994, p. 139). Forced displacement is a powerful arena for transnational 
citizens and struggle. We have already discussed the powerful protests of Sudanese 
refugees in Cairo, Liberians in Ghana, Bhutanese in Nepal, and Sudanese in Uganda. 
Currently fi ghting transnationally for both rights in exile and for rights for fellow 
Tibetan ‘stayees’, Tibetans exiled across the globe followed the Olympic torch on 
its way to China in 2008 and used the media attention it got to enhance their claims 
and protest. As many Tibetans attempted to protest against the Chinese government, 
‘crackdowns’ and detention rose in China and abroad. Yet, they held the attention of 
international media, INGOs and the UN. 
Another good example of transnational protest is that against large dams which 
Lyla Mehta has both researched and engaged in for the past 18 years. The dams on 
India’s Narmada river, apart from their high social and environmental costs, are also 
famous due to the activities of the Narmada Bachao Andolan (henceforth Andolan), one 
of the world’s most well-known social movements. Over the past 25 years, the Andolan 
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has drawn the plight of the displaced peoples affected by the Narmada dams and the 
dark sides of such top-down projects to the attention of millions of people all over the 
world. The success of high-profi le resistance activities against displacement, such as 
those on the Narmada dams, depends on transnational alliances of NGOs, campaigns 
and movements. International human rights standards, as well as the policy directives 
of international organizations, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
and World Bank, are evoked and adapted to grant salience to local struggles. These 
informal mechanisms of claiming rights and seeking accountability have been powerful 
agents of change. They have led to cost and time over-runs of projects, even though 
very few projects have offi cially been called off. The success they have achieved has 
been both symbolic and material. Even though many resisting oustees are still to receive 
compensation and rehabilitation, they are proud that they have been a part of such a 
dynamic movement and have gained a new awareness as citizens, both of India and 
the globe. As Noorjibhai, a villager from Mokhdi Maharashtra, told Lyla Mehta in 2007: 
“If there had been no protest movement, nobody would have got anything. At least 
now, many have received some land and compensation. I still refuse to leave my 
ancestral home. The government is incapable of providing us with just compensation. 
We are now aware of our rights as citizens. We have waged battles in the streets of all 
the major cities and our struggle has been taken to several countries of the world and 
Washington. We will continue to fi ght for our rights.” 
Economic globalization has, in part, led to the proliferation of demands for new 
ways of making powerful actors, within and beyond the State, accountable for the 
impacts of their actions on poor people (Goetz and Jenkins, 2004, p. 28). But economic 
globalization has also led to the proliferation of new actors. In Narmada, these include 
transnational alliances between the Andolan and NGOs around the world (such as the 
International Rivers Network; the Cornerhouse, UK; and Urgewald, Germany). These 
alliances helped exert pressure on the World Bank, which now has an Inspection 
Panel to investigate controversial projects, and also led to the formation of the World 
Commission on Dams in 2000 and its principles regarding decision-making processes 
around large dams. 
For the aforementioned refugee protests, their battle is also transnational. The 
Sudanese refugees in Cairo, for instance, are fi ghting on Egyptian soil for rights in 
Egypt or the right to be resettled by the UNHCR, without even having their refugee 
status cleared. We have thus looked at several protests by refugees and asylum seekers, 
victims of development-induced displacement from Narmada, and stateless Tibetans 
in exile. All of them are indeed transnational, as they either have been receiving 
attention and help from activists across the globe, or have been involving peoples who 
have crossed borders and are asking for their home and host states, and international 
agencies, to change policies. While protesting, however, displaced people are doing 
what they can to informally realize as many rights as possible. By sewing his lips 
together in the UK, Amani realized his right to voice as he got media attention. By 
gathering in a park for three months, Sudanese refugees in Cairo realized some of the 
rights they were demanding from UNHCR. Schafer writes: 
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“While consistently demanding that UNHCR and international community give them 
‘their rights’ and improve their situation, the sit-in itself temporarily assuaged many 
of the hardships they faced. The park was transformed into a relatively autonomous 
community of refugees who created their own sense of security and provided mutual 
support and solace for each other. The constant uncertainty and frustration associated 
with life as a refugee was eased as they were able to take back some control over their 
present lives” (2006, p. 2).
Displaced people are creating both new understandings of citizenship as also 
transnational alliances and governments in exile. They are informally realizing rights 
which states would otherwise deny them. While many displaced people do not have 
formal citizenship, some fi ght for that formality, and others loudly declare that having 
formal citizenship will not satisfy the rights they see as being the most important (see 
example of IDPs in Box 1). Realization of informal rights as well as protests for the 
realization of formal rights are the tools that displaced actors are using across the 
globe.
IGNORING RIGHTS THAT DISPLACED PEOPLE SEEK: 
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
Who is supposed to protect the rights of these ‘international orphans’ and those 
crossing international borders? In principle, by ‘voting with their feet’ (Hathaway, 
1991, p. 120), refugees fl eeing oppressive state regimes and the abuse of their human 
rights can expect protection from international law and from host countries. Under 
international law, states are obliged to protect non-citizens and those residing 
within their national borders. They thus have a strong basis for protection against 
persecution and abuse of their civil and political rights. But their social, economic 
and cultural rights falling under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) remain neglected and include: the right to development and 
self-determination,9 the right to food, health, education, participation and the right 
to livelihood, more generally. These rights are often viewed as ‘second generation’ 
rights, and host states are reluctant to award them to refugees. 
The 1969 African Union Convention Governing Specifi c Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, however, has taken great strides forward in including social 
and economic rights violations as causes for refugee fl ight and thus refugee status. 
Nonetheless, leading forced migration scholars such as Hathaway argue that there 
are some rights for refugees that are immediate, whereas others, namely economic 
rights, are progressive (Hathaway, 2005). This view, however, does not correspond to 
the perceptions of some displaced people. As discussed earlier in this paper, Kibreab’s 
examination of the offi cial refugee policy in Sudan, which constrains refugee rights, 
juxtaposes it against the actual practice of Eritrean refugees gaining access to socio-
economic rights. Eritrean refugees have gained a status that is equivalent to permanent 
residence and enjoy most of their socio-economic rights on an equal footing with 
nationals. Thus, de jure citizenship is not as important for Eritrean refugees in Sudan 
as long as they can access de facto socio-economic rights on an equal footing with 
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nationals (2003). In Egypt, refugees view citizenship as access to full protection. Due 
to the harsh economic conditions and offi cial policies of the Egyptian state, however, 
they are barred from being fully integrated in the host community. Instead, they are 
enacting and claiming their socio-economic rights in spite of the state (Grabska, 2008). 
As examples from Egypt (Box 4) and Sri Lanka (Box 2) demonstrate, social and 
economic rights are multi-layered, making it diffi cult to separate legal protection from 
economic and social realized rights. Thus, a narrow legalistic defi nition of which rights 
are more immediate can feed into the biases of states that claim that they lack the 
resources to protect the economic and social rights of their citizens, let alone refugees. 
However, why should states honour these commitments towards non-citizens, 
given that they honour existing obligations (such as the right to seek asylum) with 
such reluctance? This question goes to the heart of what constitutes membership to a 
country/community (see Grabska and Mehta, 2008). Conventionally, it is citizenship 
which facilitates this membership. However, as Hathaway, drawing on Walzer, 
argues, while states have the right to exclude non-citizens from membership in their 
country, viewing refugees as ‘necessitous strangers’ grants them special entitlements 
in a national community (1991, p. 124). This calls for both: 
“… a limited and complex redistribution of membership and/or territory… The same 
diffi culty arises with regard to wealth and resources. These, too, can be superfl uous, 
far beyond what the inhabitants of a particular state require for a decent life… [In 
these circumstances, members of the state] could share their wealth with necessitous 
strangers outside their country or with necessitous strangers inside their country.” 
(Walzer in Hathaway, 1991, p. 125).
This calls for states to extend conventional notions of membership to refugees 
in order to protect a range of political and socio-economic entitlements. As Kabeer 
argues, “Citizenship represents rules which spell out the claims and obligations of 
membership in a given community/society and ensure redistribution as a matter 
of right rather then discretion” (Kabeer, 2005, p. 25). Citizenship is presented as a 
more inclusive term, encompassing rights and obligations for those who experience 
exclusion. In this view, citizenship encompasses ideas of adherence to some notion 
of justice, whereby justice is conceptualized around the notion of when it is fair for 
people to be treated in the same way and when it is fair that they should be treated 
differently (ibid.). 
Economic and social rights have different implications for IDPs and oustees. For 
oustees at least, the protection on paper is more clear-cut. States that force population 
groups to relocate clearly need to fi rst avoid the likelihood that the social and economic 
rights of the oustees would be corroded. Secondly, if possible, they also need to 
enhance the socio-economic status of oustees and help secure a better standard of 
living for them, thus making ‘development’ a just process that enhances the life choices 
of all. Consequently, there are now growing calls for the need to link resettlement 
with wider developmental efforts. This explains why the World Commission on 
Dams (2000) seeks to make hitherto losers emerge as winners of dam projects. This 
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is also the reason why key thinkers on resettlement issues such as Cernea call for 
resettlement activities to be conceived and executed as sustainable development 
programmes, providing suffi cient investment resources to give the persons displaced by 
the project the opportunity to share in project benefi ts (Cernea, 2000). Still, Lyla Mehta 
has demonstrated how violations of rights of Narmada dam oustees take place with 
impunity, even though the oustees are full citizens of India and despite their initiation 
of a dynamic protest movement. This is due to sins of omission (that is, the lack of 
awareness of rights and the lack of resources to implement rights) or, more often, due 
to sins of commission, wherein rights are knowingly violated by powerful actors such 
as the Indian government or the World Bank (see Mehta, 2008).
EUROCENTRICISM IN LITERATURE, TAKING AWAY
AGENCY FROM CITIZENSHIP IN THE SOUTH
While several of the authors reviewed here call for new understandings of citizenship, 
there are some striking Eurocentric biases in conventional understandings of 
citizenship. Several authors seem to imply that even though there are tremendous 
problems in Europe regarding the conditions of refugees and immigrants, in non-
Western countries, the emphasis on ethnic homogeneity is often stronger and the 
rights of citizenship are restricted. They are thus saying that in many regards, Europe 
has fi gured out the issue of rights and citizenship, but other countries and regions 
have not. Castles and Davidson write, “A long struggle lies ahead not only for the 
rights of minorities, but also to create genuine citizenship for everybody” (2000, p. xi). 
They go on to say: 
“… Conditions in large areas of the world – most of Africa, Central and South Asia and 
parts of Latin America – are such that active citizenship and transnational democracy 
seem almost out of reach. Citizenship presupposes a functioning state, the rule of law 
and basic human rights guarantees. All these are absent in countries that are home to 
the majority of the world’s population… The struggle for democratic citizenship must 
therefore have a global perspective, with the aim of creating the conditions for full 
participation everywhere. Citizenship or chaos are the stark alternatives at the beginning 
of the new millennium” [emphasis added] (2000, p. xii). 
Brysk and Shafi r (2004) distinguish between the ‘heartland of citizenship’ 
(developed Europe and North America) and ‘failed states’ in Africa and elsewhere 
wherein weak and second class citizenship prevails and large numbers of non-
citizen refugees are in camps. The latter is probably the ‘chaos’ implied by Castles 
and Davidson; the former refers to so-called ‘liberal capitalist democracies’ that are 
currently engaged in expanding inter-state and transnational rights and regulating 
global markets wherein non-citizens, migrants and refugees are caught in the 
citizenship gap (Brysk and Shafi r, 2004). 
These positions seem to suggest that people in the non-Western world have no 
agency to participate in, claim their rights or experience citizenship. It also implies 
that the ‘right’ political institutions and structures (that is, those of a mature liberal 
democracy) are necessary to experience citizenship in a context of forced migration. 
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To argue that there are no citizenship rights in the South would be tantamount to 
disregarding informal practices of citizenship and how groups move between 
membership and exclusion, legitimacy and illegitimacy. It also disregards formal 
rights that are different or valued differently from Western norms. Such positions also 
create unhelpful distinctions between North and South and hierarchies of citizenship. 
As pointed out by Sassen (2004), equal citizenship is still a myth even in the US because 
groups defi ned by race, ethnicity, and other identities still face exclusion. Much is 
also written about disengagement from participation in formal politics in Western 
countries (The Power Inquiry, 2006; Hague and Harrop, 2004). 
It is important to bear in mind that today about four-fi fths of the refugees are 
hosted in southern countries (UNHCR, 2009). It is largely Southern governments that 
have to deal with massive cross-border refugee movements, not those in the North. 
Northern governments have become increasingly restrictive in admitting refugees. 
This is what Nobel has called an ‘arms race against humanitarianism’ (Nobel, 1988, 
pp. 29-30, quoted in Malkki, 1995a). Yes, when refugees are given refugee status in 
the North, they often have very good access to rights. But, most are not admitted 
when they apply. Take Iraq: just one in six of Iraq’s refugees is allowed to remain in 
the UK. Out of 310 Iraqis who sought asylum in the UK during the second quarter 
of 2007, only 30 were allowed to stay on and a further 25 were given leave to remain 
(The Observer, 7 October 2007, p. 7). Further, the Eurocentrism which sees the North 
as having solved human rights problems, has not incorporated the fact that many 
northern countries play a part in causing displacement; many of the world’s refugee 
problems are the result of superpower military and economic interventions. Thus, 
northern politics often contribute to refugee problems in the South, and the North is 
increasingly refusing to deal with the direct impacts, that is, not accepting the asylum 
claims of Iraqis who fl ee from their war-torn country. 
Hathaway writes that though they did more so in the past, “[i]n recent years, 
governments throughout the industrialised world have begun to question the logic 
of routinely assimilating refugees, and have therefore sought to limit their access to a 
variety of rights” (2005, p. 3). This seems an understatement in a world where only 25 of 
310 petitioning Iraqis were given leave to remain in the UK (during the second quarter 
of 2007). Hathaway notes “the failure of the international community to establish an 
overarching supervisory mechanism for the Refugee Convention of the kind now in 
place for virtually every other major United Nations human rights treaty” (2005, p. 13). 
Indeed, the international community is not fi rmly bound to the treaty. In fact, Article 34 
of the Refugee Convention regarding naturalization states the following:
“The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and 
naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite 
naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of 
such proceedings.”
According to this soft international law, then, states should as far as possible facilitate 
refugee citizenship. Hathaway states that “Art. 34 is not framed as a strong obligation: 
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it neither requires that state parties ultimately grant their citizenship to refugees, nor 
that refugees accept any such offer made to them” (2005, p. 981).
The Convention’s lack of strength regarding citizenship is visible in de facto
practice. Many in the EU, for instance, are currently propagating the myth of a 
common Christian/humanist/anti-Muslim experience, which props up the notion of 
the ‘Other’ (especially for immigrants from non-Christian countries such as Turkey 
and refugees from the non-Western world). Moreover, as the case of the Bosnian 
refugees in Europe highlights, once a European country is confronted by large 
numbers of refugees crossing a shared border, it tends to get more restrictive. The 
usual argument offered in both the North and South is that of ‘resource constraints’ 
of the host government and the inability to provide for its own citizens, let alone 
refugees. However, research suggests that this stance downplays refugees’ ability to 
contribute to the host economy. Refugees are not usually the poorest of the poor or the 
unskilled. Refugees have and can contribute to the economies of their hosts, but these 
skills are rarely utilized (Harrell-Bond, 2002). 
ARE REFUGEES THE ONLY TRUE TRANSNATIONAL
AND/OR GLOBAL CITIZENS? 
“The Consul banged on the table and said; 
‘If you’ve got no passport you’re offi cially dead’: 
But we are still alive, my dear, but we are still alive.” 
W. H. Auden (quoted in Malkki, 1995a, p. 495) 
In this article, we have demonstrated how displaced people are performing citizenship, 
living citizenship, in situations where their own state and most often their host state 
denies them citizenship rights. Given the way citizenship is normally understood, 
we are left wondering, “Is citizenship a useful concept for exploring the problems of 
belonging, identity and personality in the modern world?” (Schotter quoted in Sassen, 
2004, p. 195). As reviewed above, the migration/forced migration and citizenship 
literature have conceptualized some new understandings of citizenship, calling 
them: external; multi-layered or multiple; territorially-defi ned or deterritorializing; 
denationalized; global, etc. 
Some scholars argue that dual and multiple nationality will one day become the 
norm (see Sassen, 2004, p. 194). As demonstrated, when the state does not step in, 
displaced people are either self-realizing rights or they go beyond looking at the host 
state as the sole duty-bearer. They are creating lived multiple and multi-layered (that 
is, beyond or beneath the state) citizenship experiences. Sorensen suggests the notion 
of membership, rather than citizenship, because membership can be more multi-
faceted with several layers: 
“[C]itizenship is a straightforward category. One is either a citizen, or not, of a 
particular state. Membership on the other hand is more convoluted; it is not an all 
or nothing category. One can be more or less a member; one can be a member in one 
aspect but not in another. Membership is therefore a broader and more inclusive 
category than formal citizenship.” 
(Sorensen, 1996, p. 76) 
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Earlier in the article, we studied disruptions to the territory, political space 
and national concepts of citizenship and how displaced people are realizing rights 
informally where they are not granted citizenship’s right to have rights or when they 
are caught between national and international jurisdictions. We examined protest and 
mobilization efforts to have formal rights, and we witnessed transnational alliances 
across global–local spaces. These actions from people making claim to formal or to 
lived citizenship can be thought of as external citizenship, as multi-layered or multiple 
citizenship, as membership, as territorially-defi ned or deterritorialized citizenship 
and as post- and de-nationalized citizenship. Each of these concepts offers a way of 
explaining changes as well as projecting the future of citizenship. Displaced people 
push the boundaries of the citizenship concept, unsettling our norms, asking for 
change, and making change happen. The concept of global citizenship presents yet 
another powerful reconceptualization of citizenship. It is one that is already made real 
through the displaced persons’ expressions of agency.
A historical look at ‘global citizenship’ includes Nansen passports, which are 
internationally recognized identity cards fi rst issued by the League of Nations to 
stateless refugees. They were designed in 1922 by Fridtjof Nansen (Holborn, 1939), 
and 52 countries had honoured them by 1942. The fi rst refugee travel documents, these 
passports are recognized as one of the greatest achievements of the now beleaguered 
League of Nations. The World Service Authority, a non-profi t organization that 
promotes ‘world citizenship’, issues a ‘World Passport’ (purportedly under the 
authority of Article 13, Section 1, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) 
in which 170 countries have stamped visas (de facto acceptance), and of which six 
countries recognize it de jure (Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Mauritania, Tanzania, Togo and 
Zambia) (World Service Authority, 2007). 
In Nansen’s age, borders were not as tightly controlled, and the ‘refugee problem’ 
was largely a European one. Global citizenship for refugees could mean a return to 
the Nansen passport wherein refugees could be free to travel to a range of countries. It 
could also mean that governments would respect the basic right of all to a nationality. 
At the informal level, it could be an increasing presence, a multi-layered sense of 
belonging and rights claiming in global institutions. Not only global institutions, but 
states should also recognize the ‘multiple citizenships’ of peoples within its borders 
and of people who have left them. Communities and displaced individuals, of course, 
already experience and ‘live’ these multiple citizenships, and many are asking for 
formal states and institutions to formally recognize their rights as citizens. 
Louise Arbour, the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, when 
interviewed on the issue of global citizenship, said that the foremost global citizens 
are refugees (Schattle, 2005, p. 124). Benequista and Levine identify three discourses 
for global citizenship: “(1) a civic republican discourse that emphasises concepts such 
as awareness, responsibility, participation and cross-cultural empathy; (2) a libertarian 
discourse that emphasises international mobility and competitiveness; and (3) a legal 
discourse that emphasises legal rights and responsibilities of transnational actors” 
(2006, p. 3). In forced migration debates, all three discourses feature. In particular, 
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attention has been paid to the civic republican and legal discourses. These are generally 
views ‘from above’, prioritizing the civic republican discourse of moral responsibility 
(see Nussbaum, 1996) towards an ‘other’; or the legal discourse, which is often a more 
statist view. The libertarian discourse, on the other hand, which has an emphasis 
on international mobility, has the potential to take into account views ‘from below’, 
however, it only gets a meagre showing, if that—indicating that global citizenship has 
not been well-defi ned in terms of international mobility—especially for those displaced 
and forced to move. Further, international mobility in the libertarian discourse usually 
refers to upper class expatriates (Schattle, 2005) rather than those forcibly displaced. 
What Malkki describes as a ‘sedentarist metaphysics’ remains the bias. Can we move 
to a displacement lens or a migrant metaphysics as our norm? The displaced are 
demanding rights through protest and through international mobilization. From an 
actor-oriented view of citizenship, we have seen that displaced people are claiming 
what they see as citizenship rights, or as much of them as they can, in a myriad ways, 
whether informal realization locally or by demands to international entities when 
states are unresponsive.
Would it be possible to transform the rights of forced migrants into a new form 
of global citizenship, that is, membership in one or more political communities with 
institutions for participation, distribution, and enforcement? Along with others, we 
argue that multi-level citizenship may allow marginalized peoples, displaced people 
included, to be able to enhance access to their rights by appealing to levels above 
and below the state (Brysk and Shafi r, 2004, p. 212). The key problem is the lack of 
accountability of key political actors at those different levels. Take the refugee regime. 
States are not accountable to UNHCR, and UNHCR is not accountable to refugees (as 
the example of Egypt highlights). “Who could monitor the monitor?” ask Verdirame 
and Harrell-Bond, referring to the absence of monitoring of UNHCR (2005, p. 17). In 
many cases, refugees do de facto “live in a country of UNHCR” without any citizenship 
rights, as the Sudanese refugees in Cairo said. Their ‘lived’ citizenship starts with 
UNHCR. And, so does their protest, as UNHCR becomes the main body against 
which refugees protest. Similarly, development oustees are often caught between 
lack of accountability from their own governments, private companies and the World 
Bank, all of which are interested in large-scale projects and programmes that entail 
displacement, and IDPs often fl ee from oppressive regimes within states and lack the 
mechanisms to demand accountability. 
Non-citizens, refugees and other displaced people have little knowledge and 
access to accountability mechanisms. Other problems of global institutions include 
weak enforcement, excessive bureaucratization, and corruption. But in an era where 
asylum seekers are deported back to hostile situations, where the global capital 
is displacing even more people (as has been the case with recent land grabs) and 
where states crack down on non-citizens and citizens under the guise of the war on 
terror, multi-level citizenship could provide rights at different geographical levels 
(local, district or urban, state, regional and global). This would allow for national, 
sub-national and supranational identities along with different levels of loyalty. 
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Global citizenship would be based on membership in a global political institution, 
and the dilution of sovereignty could provide a positive stimulus for enhanced civic 
engagement. International law should de facto ensure the global right to rights. 
“In the world of nation-states, in an era of globalization, people out of place 
will always be at risk. While new forms of membership cannot yet grant them a 
place, evolving institutions can give them greater voice and protection” (Brysk and 
Shafi r, 2004, p. 215). This needs appropriate global governance and getting rid of 
unaccountable global decision-making. Is it unrealistic to believe in global institutions 
to uphold rights? Perhaps. Will countries, especially rich ones, submit willingly to 
processes of global governance to open their doors to strangers in need? Perhaps not. 
Despite our doubts concerning the feasibility of global citizenship, we acknowledge 
that the displacement issue cannot be addressed within the current paradigm of the 
nation-state. In sum, global citizenship may be very hard to achieve during the coming 
decades and millions of displaced people may have to wait a long time for a Nansen 
type of passport. However, these may be normative projects toward which to strive. 
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NOTES
1. The term ‘oustee’ is borrowed from the Indian literature on displacement and resettlement, 
where it is commonly used to describe people ‘ousted’ from their habitat through government 
intervention, generally for the purpose of some development-required change in land or water 
use (see Mehta and Gupte, 2003). The term oustee is preferable to ‘development-induced 
displaced’ people or ‘resettlers’ since the latter terms do not highlight the unjust and coercive 
nature of forced uprooting.
2. These UNHCR statistics exclude Palestinian refugees, who fall under the separate mandate of 
UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East).
3. The 1951 Convention lists a number of rights that should be guaranteed for refugees by the host 
government. The following articles refer to the right to work in the country of asylum: Art. 17 
re: wage-earning employment, Art. 18 re: self-employment, Art. 19 re: liberal professions, Art. 
13 re: moveable and immovable property, and Art. 14 re: artistic rights and industrial property.
4. Art. 22 guarantees access to public education for refugee children and Art. 23 deals with the 
access to public relief. 
5. Art. 3 addresses the issue of non-discrimination, and Art. 16 talks about the access to courts.
6. Two articles mentioned in the Convention address the issue of freedom of movement, including 
Art. 26 directly talking about freedom of movement and Art. 28 dealing with travel documents.
7. According to the UNHCR, there are three possible outcomes: voluntary repatriation, local 
integration or resettlement to a third country.
8. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement form UN document E/CN.4/1998/53/Add. 
2, dated 11 February 1998.
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9. 1986 General Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development endorses individuals’ rights to 
participate and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development to realise fundamental 
human freedoms. This also includes the right to self-determination over the natural environment 
and resources. The right to participation is drawn from the various articles of the International 
Bill of Human Rights, and specifi cally ILO Convention 169. Similarly, the Right to Livelihood is 
founded in the UDHR and Articles 6 and 11 of the International Covenant on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (see Robinson, 2003, p. 14).
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